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Abstract
Various semantics for studying the square of opposition and the hexagon of
opposition have been proposed recently. We interpret sentences by impre-
cise (set-valued) probability assessments on a finite sequence of conditional
events. We introduce the acceptability of a sentence within coherence-based
probability theory. We analyze the relations of the square and of the hexagon
in terms of acceptability. Then, we show how to construct probabilistic ver-
sions of the square and of the hexagon of opposition by forming suitable
tripartitions of the set of all coherent assessments. Finally, as an applica-
tion, we present new versions of the square and of the hexagon involving
generalized quantifiers.
Keywords: coherence, conditional events, hexagon of opposition, imprecise
probability, square of opposition, quantified sentences, tripartition
1. Introduction
There is a long history of investigations on the square of opposition span-
ning over two millenia [4, 38]. A square of opposition represents logical key
✩This is a substantially extended version of a paper ([45]) presented at SMPS 2016
(Soft Methods in Probability and Statistics 2016) conference held in Rome in September
12–14, 2016.
relations among basic sentence types in a diagrammatic way. The basic sen-
tence types, traditionally denoted by A (universal affirmative: “Every S is
P”), E (universal negative: “No S is P”), I (particular affirmative: “Some
S are P”), and O (particular negative: “Some S are not P”), constitute the
corners of the square. The diagonals and the sides of the square of opposi-
tion are formed by the following logical relations among the basic sentence
types: A and E are contraries (i.e., they cannot both be true), I and O are
subcontraries (i.e., they cannot both be false), A and O as well as E and
I are contradictories (i.e., they cannot both be true and they cannot both
be false), I is a subaltern of A and O is a subaltern of E (i.e., A entails I
and E entails O; for a visual representation see, e.g., Figure 3 below, and
cover the probabilities for seeing the traditional square of opposition). In
the early 1950ies, the square of opposition was expanded to the hexagon of
opposition, by adding a sentence at the top and another one at the bottom
of the square (see, e.g., Figure 5). Recently, the square of opposition as well
as the hexagon of opposition and its extensions have been investigated from
various semantic points of view (see, e.g., [3, 4, 11, 20, 21, 22, 28, 34, 35, 36]).
In this paper we present a probabilistic analysis of the square of opposition
under coherence, introduce the hexagon of opposition under coherence, and
study the semantics of basic key relations among quantified statements.
After preliminary notions (Section 2), we introduce, based on g-coherence,
a (probabilistic) notion of sentences and their acceptability and show how to
construct squares of opposition under coherence from suitable tripartitions
(Section 3). Then, we present an application of our square to the study of
generalized quantifiers (Section 4). In Section 5 we introduce the hexagon of
opposition under coherence. Section 6 concludes the paper by some remarks
on future work.
2. Preliminary Notions
The coherence-based approach to probability and to other uncertain mea-
sures has been adopted by many authors (see, e.g., [5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 24, 26, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44]); we therefore recall only selected key features
of coherence and its generalizations in this section.
An event E is a two-valued logical entity which can be either true or false.
The indicator of E is a two-valued numerical quantity which is 1, or 0, ac-
cording to whether the event E is true, or false, respectively. We use the same
symbols for events and their indicators. We denote by J the sure event (i.e.,
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tautology or logical truth) and by K the impossible event (i.e., contradiction
or logical falsehood). Moreover, given two events E and H , we denote by
E ^H (resp., E _H) conjunction (resp., disjunction). To simplify notation,
we will use the product EH to denote the conjunction E ^ H , which also
denotes the indicator of E ^H . We denote by sE the negation of E.
Given two events E and H , with H ‰ K, the conditional event E|H is de-
fined as a three-valued logical entity which is true if EH (i.e., E ^ H) is
true, false if sEH is true, and indetermined (void) if H is false ([19, p. 307]).
In terms of the betting metaphor, if you assess ppE|Hq “ p, then you are
willing to pay (resp., to receive) an amount p and to receive (resp., to pay)
1, or 0, or p, according to whether EH is true, or sEH is true, or sH is true
(bet called off), respectively. For defining coherence, consider a real func-
tion p : F Ñ R, where F is an arbitrary family of conditional events.
Consider a finite sub-family Fn “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq Ď F , and the vector
Pn “ pp1, . . . , pnq, where pi “ ppEi|Hiq , i “ 1, . . . , n. We denote by Hn the
disjunction H1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _Hn. With the pair pFn,Pn) we associate the random
gain G “
řn
i“1 siHipEi ´ piq, where s1, . . . , sn are n arbitrary real numbers.
G represents the net gain of n transactions, where for each transaction its
meaning is specified by the sign of si (plus for buying or minus for selling)
and its scaling is specified by the magnitude of si. Denoting by GHn the set
of values of G restricted to Hn, we recall
Definition 1. The function p defined on F is called coherent if and only
if, for every integer n, for every finite sub-family Fn Ď F and for every
s1, . . . , sn, it holds that: minGHn ď 0 ď maxGHn .
We say that p is incoherent if and only if p is not coherent.
As shown by Definition 1, a probability assessment is coherent if and only
if, in any finite combination of n bets, it does not happen that the values
in the set GHn are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch Book). Moreover,
coherence of ppE|Hq requires that ppE|Hq P r0, 1s for every E|H P F . If p on
F is coherent, we call it a conditional probability on F (see, e.g., [1, 17, 47]).
Notice that, if p is coherent, then p also satisfies all the well known properties
of finitely additive conditional probability (while the converse does not hold;
see, e.g., [17, Example 13] or [23, Example 8]).
In what follows F will denote finite sequence of conditional events. Let
F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq. We denote by P a (precise) probability assessment
P “ pp1, . . . , pnq on F , where pj “ ppEj |Hjq P r0, 1s, j “ 1, . . . , n. Moreover,
we denote by Π the set of all coherent precise assessments on F . We recall
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that when there are no logical relations among the events E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn
involved in F , that is E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn are logically independent, then the
set Π associated with F is the whole unit hypercube r0, 1sn. If there are
logical relations, then the set Π could be a strict subset of r0, 1sn. As it is
well known Π ‰ H; therefore, H ‰ Π Ď r0, 1sn. If not stated otherwise, we
do not make any assumptions concerning logical independence.
Definition 2. An imprecise, or set-valued, assessment I on a family of
conditional events F is a (possibly empty) set of precise assessments P on
F .
Definition 2 states that an imprecise (probability) assessment I on a se-
quence of n conditional events F is just a (possibly empty) subset of r0, 1sn
([25, 27, 28]). For instance, think about an agent (like Pythagoras) who
considers only rational numbers to evaluate the probability of an event
E|H . Pythagoras’ evaluation can be represented by the imprecise assess-
ment I “ r0, 1s XQ on E|H . Moreover, a constraint like ppE|Hq ą 0 can be
represented by the imprecise assessment I “s0, 1s on E|H .
Given an imprecise assessment I we denote by sI the complementary im-
precise assessment of I, i.e. sI “ r0, 1snzI. We now recall the notions of
g-coherence and total coherence in the general case of imprecise (in the sense
of set-valued) probability assessments [28].
Definition 3 (g-coherence). Given a sequence of n conditional events F .
An imprecise assessment I Ď r0, 1sn on F is g-coherent iff there exists a
coherent precise assessment P on F such that P P I.
Definition 4 (t-coherence). An imprecise assessment I on F is totally co-
herent (t-coherent) iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) I is
non-empty; (ii) if P P I, then P is a coherent precise assessment on F .
Definition 5 (t-coherent part). Given a sequence of n conditional events
F . Let Π be the set of all coherent assessments on F . We denote by pi :
℘pr0, 1snq Ñ ℘pΠq the function defined by pipIq “ Π X I, for any imprecise
assessment I P ℘pr0, 1snq. Moreover, for each subset I P ℘pr0, 1snq we call
pipIq the t-coherent part of I.
Of course, if pipIq ‰ H, then I is g-coherent and pipIq is t-coherent.
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3. From Imprecise Assessments to the Square of Opposition
In this section we consider imprecise assessments on a given sequence F
of n conditional events. In our approach, a sentence s is a pair pF , Iq, where
I Ď r0, 1sn is an imprecise assessment on F . We introduce the following
equivalence relation under t-coherence:
Definition 6. Given two sentences s1 : pF , I1q and s2 : pF , I2q, s1 and s2
are equivalent (under t-coherence), denoted by s1 ” s2, iff pipI1q “ pipI2q.
Definition 7. Given three sentences s : pF , Iq, s1 : pF , I1q, and s2 : pF , I2q.
We define: s1 ^ s2 : pF , I1 X I2q (conjunction); s1 _ s2 : pF , I1 Y I2q (dis-
junction); s : pF , sIq, where sI “ r0, 1snzI (negation).
Remark 1. As the basic operations among sentences are defined by set-
theoretical operations, they inherit the corresponding properties (including
associativity, commutativity, De Morgan’s law, etc.). Moreover, as pipI1 X
I2q “ pipI1q X pipI2q, by setting s
˚
1
“ pF , pipI1qq, s
˚
2
“ pF , pipI2qq and ps1 ^
s2q
˚ : pF , pipI1XI2qq, it follows that ps1^s2q ” ps1^s2q
˚ ” s˚
1
^s˚
2
. Likewise,
s1 _ s2 ” ps1 _ s2q
˚ ” s˚
1
_ s˚
2
.
As we interpret the basic sentence types involved in the square of opposi-
tion by imprecise probability assessments on sequences of conditional events,
we will introduce the following notion of acceptability, which serves as a
semantic bridge between basic sentence types and imprecise assessments:
Definition 8. A sentence s : pF , Iq is (resp., is not) acceptable iff the
assessment I on F is (resp., is not) g-coherent, i.e. pipIq is not (resp., is)
empty.
Remark 2. If s1^s2 is acceptable, then s1 is acceptable and s2 is acceptable.
However, the converse does not hold, indeed s1 : pE|H, t1uq is acceptable and
s2 : pE|Hq, t0uq is acceptable, but s1 ^ s2 : pE|H,Hq is not acceptable (as
pipHq “ H).
Definition 9. Given two sentences s1 : pF , I1q and s2 : pF , I2q, we say,
under coherence: s1 and s2 are contraries iff the sentence s1 ^ s2 is not
acceptable;1 s1 and s2 are subcontraries iff s1 ^ s2 is not acceptable; s1 and
1 Some definitions of contrariety additionally require that “s1 and s2 can both be
acceptable”. For reasons stated in [28], we omit this additional requirement. Similarly,
mutatis mutandis, in our definition of subcontrariety.
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s2 are contradictories iff s1 and s2 are both, contraries and subcontraries; s2
is a subaltern of s1 iff the sentence s1 ^ s2 is not acceptable.
Remark 3. By Remark 1, we observe that two sentences s1 and s2 are
contraries if and only if pipI1 X I2q “ pipI1q X pipI2q “ H. Moreover, two
sentences s1 and s2 are subcontraries if and only if pipsI1 X sI2q “ pipsI1q X
pipsI2q “ H, that is (by De Morgan’s law) if and only if pipI1q Y pipI2q “ Π.
Then, two sentences s1 and s2 are contradictories if and only if pipI1q X
pipI2q “ H and pipI1q Y pipI2q “ Π, that is if and only if s2 “ s1 (and, of
course, s1 “ s2). Given two sentences s1, s2 we also observe that s2 is a
subaltern of s1 if and only if Π X pI1 X sI2q “ H, which also amounts to say
that Π X I1 Ď Π X I2, that is if and only if pipI1q Ď pipI2q. For instance,
s1 _ s2 is a subaltern of s1 and also of s2; similarly, s1 is a subaltern of
s1^ s2, and s2 is a subaltern of s1^ s2. Furthermore, if s1 is not acceptable,
that is pipI1q “ H, then any sentence s2 is a subaltern of s1. For example,
the sentence s1 : pE| sE, t1uq is not acceptable because Π “ t0u and then any
sentence s2 : pE| sE, Iq, where I Ď r0, 1s, is a subaltern of s1.
Based on the relations given in Definition 9 we define a square of oppo-
sition as follows.
Definition 10. Let sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, be four sentences. We call the
ordered quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q a square of opposition (under coherence), iff
the following relations among the four sentences hold:
(a) s1 and s2 are contraries, i.e., pipI1q X pipI2q “ H;
(b) s3 and s4 are subcontraries, i.e., pipI3q Y pipI4q “ Π;
(c) s1 and s4 are contradictories, i.e., pipI1q X pipI4q “ H and
pipI1q Y pipI4q “ Π;
s2 and s3 are contradictories, i.e., pipI2q X pipI3q “ H and
pipI2q Y pipI3q “ Π;
(d) s3 is a subaltern of s1, i.e., pipI1q Ď pipI3q;
s4 is a subaltern of s2, i.e., pipI2q Ď pipI4q.
Figure 1 shows the square of opposition based on Definition 10.
Remark 4. Based on Definition 10, we observe that in order to verify if a
quadruple of sentences ps1, s2, s3, s4q, where sk : pF , Ikq and k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, is a
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s1
s3 s4
s2
subalterns subalternscontradictories
contraries
subcontraries
Figure 1: Probabilistic square of opposition defined by the quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q. The
arrows indicate subalternation, dashed lines indicate contraries, and dotted lines indicate
sub-contraries. Contradictories are indicated by combined dotted and dashed lines.
square of opposition, it is necessary and sufficient to check that the quadruple
ps1
1
, s1
2
, s1
3
, s1
4
q, where s1k “ pF , I
1
kq, I
1
k “ pipIkq, is a square of opposition.
Then, we say that two squares ps1, s2, s3, s4q and ps
1
1
, s1
2
, s1
3
, s1
4
q coincide iff
pipIkq “ pipI
1
kq for each k. Moreover, based on Definition 10, we observe
that ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition iff ps2, s1, s4, s3q is a square of
opposition.
Definition 11. An (ordered) tripartition of a set S is a triple pD1,D2,D3q,
where D1, D2, and D3 are subsets of S, such that the following conditions are
satisfied: (i) DiXDj “ H, i ‰ j for all i, j “ 1, 2, 3; (ii); D1YD2YD3 “ S.
Theorem 1. Given any sequence of n conditional events F and a quadru-
ple ps1, s2, s3, s4q of sentences, with sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, 2, 3, 4. Define
D1 “ pipI1q, D2 “ pipI2q, and D3 “ pipI3q X pipI4q. Then, the quadruple
ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition if and only if pD1,D2,D3q is a tripar-
tition of (the non-empty set) Π such that: pipI3q “ D1YD3, pipI4q “ D2YD3.
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Proof. pñq. We assume that D1 “ pipI1q, D2 “ pipI2q, and D3 “ pipI3q X
pipI4q. Of course, Di Ď Π, i “ 1, 2, 3. We now prove that: piq D1 XD2 “ H;
piiq D3 “ ΠzpD1 Y D2q. piq From condition (a) in Definition 10, as s1 and
s2 are contraries, it follows that D1 X D2 “ H. piiq We first prove that
D3 Ď ΠzpD1YD2q. This trivially follows when D3 “ H. If D3 ‰ H, then let
x P D3 “ pipI3qXpipI4q. As x P pipI3q, from condition (c) in Definition 10, we
obtain x R pipI2q. Likewise, as x P pipI4q, from condition (c) in Definition 10,
we obtain x R pipI1q. Then, x P Π and x R ppipI1qYpipI2qq, that is x P ΠzpD1Y
D2q. We now prove that ΠzpD1 Y D2q Ď D3. This trivially follows when
ΠzpD1 Y D2q “ H. If ΠzpD1 Y D2q ‰ H, let x P ΠzppipI1q Y pipI2qq. As x P
ΠzpipI1q, from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x P pipI4q. Likewise,
as x P ΠzpipI2q from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x P pipI3q.
Then, x P ppipI3q X pipI4qq “ D3. Therefore pD1,D2,D3q is a tripartition
of Π. By our assumption, pipI1q “ D1 and pipI2q “ D2. We observe that
pipI3q X D3 “ D3; moreover, from conditions (c) and (d), we obtain pipI3q X
D2 “ pipI3q X pipI2q “ H and pipI3q X D1 “ pipI1q X pipI3q “ pipI1q “ D1;
then pipI3q “ pipI3q X pD1 YD2 YD3q “ D1 YD3. Likewise, we observe that
pipI4qXD3 “ D3; moreover, from conditions (c),(d) in Definition 10, we obtain
D1XpipI4q “ pipI1qXpipI4q “ H andD2XpipI4q “ pipI2qXpipI4q “ pipI2q “ D2;
then pipI4q “ pipI4q X pD1 YD2 YD3q “ D2 YD3.
pðq Assume that pD1,D2,D3q, where D1 “ pipI1q, D2 “ pipI2q, D3 “ pipI3qX
pipI4q, is a tripartition of Π such that D1YD3 “ pipI3q and D2YD3 “ pipI4q,
we prove that the quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c),
and (d) in Definition 10. We observe that pipI1q X pipI2q “ D1 X D2 “ H,
which coincides with (a). Condition (b) is satisfied because pipI3q Y pipI4q “
D1 Y D3 Y D2 Y D3 “ Π. Moreover, pipI1q X pipI4q “ D1 X pD2 Y D3q “ H
and pipI1q Y pipI4q “ D1 Y pD2 Y D3q “ Π; likewise, pipI2q X pipI3q “ D2 X
pD1 Y D3q “ H and pipI2q Y pipI3q “ D2 Y pD1 Y D3q “ Π. Thus, the
conditions in (c) are satisfied. Finally, pipI1q “ D1 Ď D1 Y D3 “ pipI3q and
pipI2q “ D2 Ď D2 YD3 “ pipI4q which satisfy conditions in (d).
A method to construct a square of opposition by starting from a tripar-
tition of Π is given in the following result (see also [20]).
Corollary 1. Given any sequence of n conditional events F and a tripar-
tition pD1,D2,D3q of Π, then the quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q, with sk : pF , Ikq,
k “ 1, 2, 3, 4 and pipI1q “ D1, pipI2q “ D2, pipI3q “ D1YD3, pipI4q “ D2YD3
is a square of opposition.
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Proof. The proof immediately follows by observing pipI3q X pipI4q “ D3 and
by the (ð) side proof of Theorem 1.
The following result allows to construct a square of opposition by starting
from a tripartition of the whole set r0, 1sn:
Corollary 2. Given a tripartition pB1,B2,B3q of r0, 1s
n, let I1 “ B1, I2 “
B2, I3 “ B1YB3, and I4 “ B2YB3. For any sequence of n conditional events
F , the quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q, where sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, is a square
of opposition.
Proof. Let F be any sequence of n conditional events and Π be the associated
set of all coherent precise assessments. We set Di “ pipBiq, i “ 1, 2, 3. Of
course, ppipB1q, pipB2q, pipB3qq is a tripartition of Π. Moreover, pipI1q “ D1,
pipI2q “ D2, pipI3q “ D1YD3, pipI4q “ D2YD3. Then, by applying Corollary 1
we obtain that ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition.
Traditionally the square of opposition can be constructed based on the
fragmented square of opposition which requires only the contrariety and con-
tradiction relations (which goes back to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 6–7,
17b.17–26, see [38, Section 2]). This result also holds in our framework:
Theorem 2. The quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q of sentences, with sk : pF , Ikq,
k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, is a square of opposition iff relations (a) and (c) in Definition 10
are satisfied.
Proof. pñq It follows directly from Definition 10. pðq We prove that (d)
and (b) in Definition 10 follow from (a) and (c). If pipI1q “ H, then of course
pipI1q Ď pipI3q. If pipI1q ‰ H, let x P pipI1q Ď Π, from (a) it follows that
x R pipI2q, and since (c) requires pipI2q Y pipI3q “ Π, we obtain x P pipI3q.
Thus, pipI1q Ď pipI3q; likewise, pipI2q Ď pipI4q. Therefore, (d) is satisfied.
Now we prove that (b) is satisfied, i.e. pipI3q Y pipI4q “ Π. Of course,
pipI3q Y pipI4q Ď Π. Let x P Π. If x R pipI3q, then, x P pipI2q from (c).
Moreover, from (d), x P pipI4q. Then, Π Ď pipI3q Y pipI4q. Therefore, (b) is
satisfied.
Corollary 3. The quadruple ps1, s2, s3, s4q of sentences, with sk : pF , Ikq,
k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, is a square of opposition if and only if ps1, s2, s3, s4q “
ps1, s2, s2, s1q with s1 and s2 being contraries.
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B1pxqB2pxq B3pxq
0 11´ x x
Figure 2: Example of a tripartition pB1pxq,B2pxq,B3pxqq of r0, 1s, with x Ps
1
2
, 1s.
Proof. Of course, if ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition, then s1 and s2 are
contraries. Moreover, s1 and s4 are contradictories, that is: pipI1q X pipI4q “
H and pipI1q Y pipI4q “ Π. Therefore, ΠzpipI4q “ pipI1q, which amounts
to s4 “ s1. Similary, as s2 and s3 are contradictories, it holds that s3 “ s2.
Conversely, assume that s1 and s2 are contraries. By instantiating Theorem 2
with s3 “ s2 and with s4 “ s1, it follows that the quadruple ps1, s2, s2, s1q is
a square of opposition.
4. Square of Opposition and Generalized Quantifiers
Let F be a conditional event P |S (where S ‰ K) and pB1pxq,B2pxq,B3pxqq
be a tripartition of r0, 1s, where B1pxq “ rx, 1s, B2pxq “ r0, 1 ´ xs, B3pxq “
s1´ x, xr and x Ps1
2
, 1s (see Figure 2).
Consider the quadruple of sentences pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, with Apxq :
pP |S, IApxqq, Epxq : pP |S, IEpxqq, Ipxq : pP |S, IIpxqq, Opxq : pP |S, IOpxqq,
where IApxq “ B1pxq “ rx, 1s, IEpxq “ B2pxq “ r0, 1 ´ xs, IIpxq “
B1pxq Y B3pxq “s1 ´ x, 1s, and IOpxq “ B2pxq Y B3pxq “ r0, xr. By ap-
plying Corollary 2 with ps1, s2, s3, s4q “ pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, it follows
that pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq is a square of opposition for any x Ps1
2
, 1s (see
Figure 3). We recall that in presence of some logical relations between P
and S the set Π could be a strict subset of r0, 1s. In particular, we have the
following three cases (see, [29, 30]): (i) if P ^ S ‰ K and P ^ S ‰ S, then
Π “ r0, 1s; (ii) if P ^ S “ S, then Π “ t1u; (iii) if P ^ S “ K, then Π “ t0u.
The quadruple pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, with the threshold 1
2
ă x ď 1, is a
square of opposition in each of the three cases. In particular we obtain: case
(i) pipIApxqq “ IApxq, pipIEpxqq “ IEpxq,pipIIpxqq “ IIpxq, and pipIOpxqq “ IOpxq;
case (ii): pipIApxqq “ t1u, pipIEpxqq “ H,pipIIpxqq “ t1u, and pipIOpxqq “ H;
case (iii): pipIApxqq “ H, pipIEpxqq “ t1u,pipIIpxqq “ H, and pipIOpxqq “ t1u.
We note that in cases (ii) and (iii) we obtain degenerated squares each,
where—apart from the contradictory relations—all relations are strength-
ened. Specifically, both contrary and the subcontrary become contradictory
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Apxq
ppP |Sq ě x
Ipxq
ppP |Sq ą 1´ x
Opxq
ppP |Sq ă x
E(x)
ppP |Sq ď 1´ x
subalterns subalternscontradictories
contraries
subcontraries
Figure 3: Probabilistic square of opposition Spxq defined on the four sentence types
pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq with the threshold x Ps 1
2
, 1s (see also Table 1). It provides a
new interpretation of the traditional square of opposition (see, e.g., [38]), where the cor-
ners are labeled by “Every S is P” (A), “No S is P” (E), “Some S is P” (I), and “Some
S is not P” (O).
relations. Moreover, both subalternation relations become symmetric. As by
coherence ppP |Sq ` pp sP |Sq “ 1, a sentence s : pP |S, Iq is equivalent to the
sentence s1 : p sP |S, sIq, where sI “ r0, 1szI. Table 1 presents generalization of
basic sentence types Apxq, Epxq, Ipxq, and Opxq involving generalized quan-
tifiers Q. The generalized quantifiers are defined on a threshold x ą 1
2
. The
value of the threshold may be context dependent and provides lots of flexi-
bility for modeling various instances of generalized quantifiers (like “most”,
“almost all”).
Given two thresholds x1 and x2, with
1
2
ă x2 ă x1 ď 1, we analyze the
relations among the same sentence types in the two squares of opposition
Spx1q and Spx2q, with Spxiq “ pApxiq, Epxiq, Ipxiq, Opxiqq, i “ 1, 2. It can
be easily proved that: Apx2q is a subaltern of Apx1q, Epx2q is a subaltern of
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Sentence Probability constraints Assessment on P |S
Apxq : pQěx S are P ) ppP |Sq ě x IApxq “ rx, 1s
Epxq : pQěx S are not P ) pp sP |Sq ě x IEpxq “ r0, 1´ xs
Ipxq : (Qą1´x S are P ) ppP |Sq ą 1´ x IIpxq “s1´ x, 1s
Opxq : (Qą1´x S are not P ) pp sP |Sq ą 1´ x IOpxq “ r0, xr
Ap1q : (Every S is P ) ppP |Sq “ 1 IA “ t1u
Ep1q : (No S is P ) pp sP |Sq “ 1 IE “ t0u
Ip1q : (Some S is P ) ppP |Sq ą 0 II “s0, 1s
Op1q : (Some S is not P ) pp sP |Sq ą 0 IO “ r0, 1r
Table 1: Probabilistic interpretation of the sentence types A, E, I, and O involving
generalized quantifiers Q defined by a threshold x (with x Ps 1
2
, 1s) on the subject S and
predicate P and the respective imprecise probabilistic assessments IApxq, IEpxq, IIpxq, and
IOpxq on the conditional event P |S (above). When x “ 1, we obtain our probabilistic
interpretation of the traditional sentence types A, E, I, and O (below).
Epx1q, Ipx1q is a subaltern of Ipx2q, and Opx1q is a subaltern of Opx2q. In the
extreme case x “ 1 we obtain the probabilistic interpretation under coherence
of the basic sentence types involved in the traditional square of opposition
pA,E, I, Oq (see [27, 28] for the default square of opposition, involving defaults
and negated defaults).
In agreement with De Morgan (as pointed out by [20]) by the quadruple
pa, e, i, oqwe denotes the square of opposition obtained from pA,E, I, Oqwhen
the events P and S are replaced by sP and sS, respectively. Specifically,
a : p sP |sS, t1uq, e : p sP |sS, t0uq, i : p sP |sS, s0, 1sq, and o : p sP |sS, r0, 1rq.
In the general case when P and S are logically independent it can be
proved that the set of all coherent assessments on pP |S, sP |sSq is the square
r0, 1s2 (see e.g. [17]; see also [14, Proposition 1] [15, Theorem 4]). Thus,
in the general case there are no relations between any two sentences s1 and
s2, where s1 P tA,E, I, Ou and s2 P ta, e, i, ou. Therefore, the two squares
pA,E, I, Oq and pa, e, i, oq do not form a cube of opposition (with these two
squares as opposite facing sides).
5. Hexagon of Opposition
Compared to the millennia long history of investigations on the square of
opposition, the hexagon of opposition was discovered fairly recently, namely
in the 1950ies. The hexagon generalizes the square by adding the disjunction
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of the top vertices of the square to build a new vertex at the top and by adding
the conjunction of the bottom vertices of the square to build a new vertex
at the bottom. According to Be´ziau ([2]), the hexagon of opposition was
introduced by the French priest and logician Augustin Sesmat ([48]) and by
the philosopher Robert Blanche´ ([7]), who worked out the full structure of the
hexagon of opposition (for his main work on the hexagon of opposition see
[8]). Jaspers and Seuren ([33]) trace the history of the hexagon back also to
the American philosopher Paul Jacoby ([32], see also [20]). In this section we
will use the tools developed in Section 3, to construct a hexagon of opposition
by starting from a square of opposition. More precisely, given a traditional
square of opposition pA,E, I, Oq, by setting U “ A_E, Y “ I^O, the tuple
pA,E, I, O, U, Y q defines a hexagon of opposition. Accordingly, we define the
(probabilistic) hexagon of opposition in our approach as follows:
Definition 12 (Hexagon of opposition). Let sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
be six sentences. We call the ordered tuple ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q a hexagon of
opposition (under coherence), if and only if the following relations among
the six sentences hold:
(i) ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition;
(ii) s5 “ s1 _ s2;
(iii) s6 “ s3 ^ s4.
Figure 4 shows the probabilistic hexagon of opposition as given by Defi-
nition 12.
Theorem 3. Let sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, be six sentences.
The tuple ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q is a hexagon of opposition, if and only if
ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q “ ps1, s2, s2, s1, s1 _ s2, s1 ^ s2q, with s1 and s2 being
contraries.
Proof. pñq. Let ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q be a hexagon of opposition. Then, as
ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition, s1 and s2 are contraries. More-
over, by Corollary 3, it follows that ps1, s2, s3, s4q “ ps1, s2, s2, s1q. Then,
by Definition 12, s5 “ s1 _ s2 and s6 “ s3 ^ s4 “ s1 ^ s2. Therefore,
ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q “ ps1, s2, s2, s1, s1 _ s2, s1 ^ s2q.
pðq. Let ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q “ ps1, s2, s2, s1, s1 _ s2, s1 ^ s2q, with s1 and s2
being contraries. From Corollary 3, it follows that ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square
13
s2
s5
s1
s3
s6
s4
Figure 4: Probabilistic hexagon of opposition defined on the six sentence types
ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q, where ps1, s2, s3, s4q is a square of opposition, s5 “ s1 _ s2, and
s6 “ s3 ^ s4 (see Definition 12). For the meaning of the lines see Figure 1.
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of opposition. Then, by relations piiq and piiiq in Definition 12, it follows
that ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q is a hexagon of opposition.
Remark 5. Assume that s1 and s2 are contraries. Then, by Corollary 3, the
quadruple ps1, s2, s2, s1q is a square of opposition, and by Definition 12, the
tuple ps1, s2, s2, s1, s1 _ s2, s1 ^ s2q is a hexagon of opposition.
We now consider relations among a tripartition of the set of all coherent
assessments Π and a hexagon of opposition.
Remark 6. Given a hexagon of opposition ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q, we observe
that the sentence s6 “ s3^s4 represents the pair pF , I6q, where I6 “ I3XI4.
Moreover, by Remark 1, pipI6q “ pipI3 X I4q “ pipI3q X pipI4q. Therefore,
based on Theorem 1, the triple pD1,D2,D3q, where D1 “ pipI1q, D2 “ pipI2q,
and D3 “ pipI6q, is a tripartition of Π. Conversely, based on Corollary 1,
given a tripartition pD1,D2,D3q of Π, the sequence ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q where
sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, . . . , 6, with pipI1q “ D1, pipI2q “ D2, pipI3q “ D1 Y D3,
pipI4q “ D2YD3, pipI5q “ D1YD2, and pipI6q “ D3, is a hexagon of opposition
(see also [11, 20, 21]).
Next, we consider relations among a tripartition of r0, 1sn and a hexagon
of opposition.
Remark 7. Based on Corollary 2, we can also construct a hexagon of op-
position by starting from a tripartition of the whole set r0, 1sn. Specifically,
given a tripartition pB1,B2,B3q of r0, 1s
n, let I1 “ B1, I2 “ B2, I3 “ B1YB3,
I4 “ B2YB3, I5 “ B1YB2, and I6 “ B3. For any sequence of n conditional
events F , the tuple ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q, where sk : pF , Ikq, k “ 1, . . . , 6, is a
hexagon of opposition.
Theorem 4. Given a hexagon of opposition ps1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6q, by Defini-
tion 12 all relations among the basic sentence types in the square ps1, s2, s3, s4q
hold. Moreover, by Theorem 3 (and also by Remark 3), the following relations
hold:
(i) s1 and s6 are contraries (since s6 “ s2^ s1 and pipI1X sI2X sI1q “ H);
(ii) s2 and s6 are contraries (since s6 “ s2 ^ s1 and pipI2 X sI2 X sI1q “ H);
(iii) s3 is a subaltern of s6 (since s6 “ s3 ^ s4);
15
(iv) s4 is a subaltern of s6 (since s6 “ s3 ^ s4);
(v) s5 is a subaltern of s1 (since s5 “ s1 _ s2);
(vi) s5 is a subaltern of s2 (since s5 “ s1 _ s2);
(vii) s5 and s3 are subcontraries (as s5 “ s1 _ s2 and s3 “ s2, hence pipI1 Y
I2q Y sI2q “ Π);
(viii) s5 and s4 are subcontraries (as s5 “ s1 _ s2 and s4 “ s1, hence pipI1 Y
I2q Y sI1q “ Π);
(ix) s5 and s6 are contradictories (as s5 “ s1 _ s2, s6 “ s3 ^ s4 “ s2 ^ s1,
hence pippI1Y I2qX psI1X sI2qq “ H) and pippI1YI2qY psI1X sI2qq “ Π).
Figure 4 illustrates all the relations in the hexagon of opposition described
in Theorem 4. This figure also shows the two triangles T1 : ps1, s2, s6q and T2 :
ps3, s4, s5q. We note that the sides of T1 consist of contrary relations, whereas
the sides of T2 consist of subcontrary relations. Moreover, the coherent part
of the imprecise assessments defined by sentences in T1 (i.e., D1 “ pipI1q,
D2 “ pipI2q and D3 “ pipI6q) forms a tripartition pD1,D2,D3q of Π. Whereas,
the imprecise assessments defined by sentences in T2 are such that pipI3q “
D1 YD3, pipI4q “ D2 YD3, and pipI5q “ D1 YD2.
By basing the hexagon of opposition on the square of opposition
pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq (as introduced in Section 4) we obtain the following
hexagon of opposition: pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq with x Ps1{2, 1s,
where Upxq denotes Apxq _ Epxq and Y pxq denotes Ipxq ^ Opxq (see Ta-
ble 2). Figure 5 illustrates the hexagon pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq
with x Ps1{2, 1s.
We now consider a generalization of the hexagon of opposition
pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq by considering n conditional events. In
particular, let F “ pP1|S1, . . . , Pn|Snq be a sequence of n conditional events.
Exploiting Remark 7, we construct a hexagon of opposition by considering
the following tripartition of r0, 1sn: pB1pxq,B2pxq,B3pxqq, with x Ps1{2, 1s,
where
B1pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n :
řn
i“1
pi
n
ě xu,
B2pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n :
řn
i“1
pi
n
ď 1´ xu,
B3pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n : 1´ x ă
řn
i“1
pi
n
ă xu.
We obtain the following (generalized) hexagon of opposition
pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq, with the quantified statements
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Epxq : ppP |Sq ď 1´ x
Upxq : ppP |Sq P r0, 1´ xs Y rx, 1s
Apxq : ppP |Sq ě x
Ipxq : ppP |Sq ą 1´ x
Y pxq : 1´ x ă ppP |Sq ă x
Opxq : ppP |Sq ă x
Figure 5: Probabilistic hexagon of opposition defined on the six sentence types with the
threshold x Ps 1
2
, 1s (see also Table 1). It provides a new interpretation of the hexagon
of opposition, which we compose of the probabilistic square of opposition and the two
additional vertices Upxq (i.e., Apxq_Epxq; top) and Y pxq (i.e., Ipxq^Opxq; bottom). For
the meaning of the lines see Figure 1.
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Sentence Probability constr. Assessment on P |S
Upxq : Apxq _ Epxq
ppP |Sq ě x
or
pp sP |Sq ě x IUpxq “ r0, 1´ xs Y rx, 1s
Y pxq : Ipxq ^Opxq
"
ppP |Sq ą 1´ x
pp sP |Sq ą 1´ x IY pxq “s1´ x, xr
Up1q :
Every S is P
or
No S is P
ppP |Sq “ 1
or
pp sP |Sq “ 1 IU “ t0u Y t1u
Y p1q :
Some S is P
and
Some S is sP
"
ppP |Sq ą 0
pp sP |Sq ą 0 IY “s0, 1r
Table 2: Probabilistic interpretation of the sentence types at the top (U) and at the
bottom (Y ) of the hexagon of opposition involving generalized quantifiers Q defined by a
threshold x (with x Ps 1
2
, 1s) on the subject S and predicate P and the respective imprecise
probabilistic assessments IUpxq, and IY pxq on the conditional event P |S (above). When
x “ 1, we obtain our probabilistic interpretation of the traditional sentence types U , Y .
Apxq : pF , IApxqq, Epxq : pF , IEpxqq, Ipxq : pF , IIpxqq, Opxq : pF , IOpxqq,
Upxq : pF , IUpxqq, Y pxq : pF , IY pxqq, where
IApxq “ B1pxq, IEpxq “ B2pxq, IY pxq “ B3pxq,
IIpxq “ B1pxq Y B3pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n :
řn
i“1
pi
n
ą 1´ xu,
IOpxq “ B2pxq Y B3pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n :
řn
i“1
pi
n
ă xu,
IUpxq “ B1pxq Y B2pxq “ tpp1, . . . , pnq P r0, 1s
n :
řn
i“1
pi
n
ě x or
řn
i“1
pi
n
ď 1´ xu.
6. Concluding Remarks
Finally, we note that conditional probability interpretations of quantified
statements were also proposed in psychology (see, e.g., [12, 13, 37, 39, 41, 43,
46]), since generalized quantifiers are psychologically much more plausible
compared to the traditional logical quantifiers, as the latter are either too
strict (@ does not allow for exceptions) or too weak (D quantifies over at least
one object) for formalizing everyday life sentences. Recent experimental data
suggests that people negate conditionals and quantified statements mainly
by building contraries (in the sense of inferring pp C|Aq “ 1 ´ x from the
negated ppC|Aq “ x) but hardly ever by building contradictories (in the sense
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of inferring ppC|Aq ă x from the negated ppC|Aq “ x; see [40, 46]). However,
this empirical result calls for further experiments. The square presented
in Section 4 and the hexagon presented in Section 5 can serve as a new
rationality framework for formal-normative and psychological investigations
of basic relations among quantified statements.
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